


# Hardening Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 Steve Grubb, Red Hat


## Hardening RHEL5

- Learn a little about some threats
- Go over some often missed configuration items
- Show how to make the system security better

### **Intrusion Goals**




#### Network Intrusion Attack Tree



Steve Grubb, Red Hat



### Privilege Escalation Attack Tree



## System Update

Keep your system updated!

 If we know there is a problem, you should seriously consider taking the update


Some vulnerabilities can be mitigated by configuration Some cannot



## How Do We Find Vulnerabilities?

March 2005 – March 2007

other peer FLOSS distributors (vendor-sec)
relationship with upstream developers
monitoring public mailing lists
relationship with Mitre CVE project
Red Hat discovered
individual contacted us
monitoring other distributions
security research company (iDefense,)
vulnerability co-ordination centers (CERT,)







## Setting a severity rating

Based on a technical assessment of the flaw, not the threat

- Unique to each Red Hat Enterprise Linux distribution
- Sets the priority through Engineering and QA
- Trend tracking (source, reported, public)








### Critical

"A vulnerability whose exploitation could allow the propagation of an Internet worm without user action."






**Important** 

"easily compromise the Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability of resources"






### Moderate

"harder or more unlikely to be exploitable"





Low

"unlikely circumstances .. or where a successful exploit would lead to minimal consequences"



## Release Policy

### For critical vulnerabilities

- Will be pushed immediately as embargo is lifted, or when passed QE
- Will be pushed at any time or day

## For important vulnerabilities

May be held until reasonable time or day

### For moderate or low vulnerabilities

 May be held until other issues come up in the same package, or the next Update release

# secalert @redhat.com - Address used for internal and external customers to ask security vulnerability related questions

- Reporting new vulnerabilities
- Asking how we addressed various vulnerabilities



## **Partitioning**

Keep directories that users can write to on their own partition

- Prevents hard linking to setuid programs
- Allows precise control over mount options

```
$ Is -li test
13697075 -rwsr-x--- 1 root root 8666 2008-02-15 14:20 test
$ In ./test test2
$ Is -li test2
13697075 -rwsr-x--- 2 root root 8666 2008-02-15 14:20 test2
$ make
gcc -g -W -Wall -Wundef test.c -o test
$ Is -li test
13697055 -rwsr-x--- 1 root root 8948 2008-02-17 15:53 test
$ Is -li test2
13697075 -rwsr-x--- 1 root root 8666 2008-02-15 14:20 test2
```



## **Partitioning**

Allow minimal privileges via mount options

- Noexec on everything possible
- Nodev everywhere except / and chroot partitions
- Nosetuid everywhere except /
- Consider making /var/tmp link to /tmp, or maybe mount –bind option

#### A reasonable /etc/fstab:

LABEL=/	/	ext3	defaults	1	1	
LABEL=/tmp	/tmp	ext3	defaults, nosuid, noexec, nodev	1	2	
LABEL=/var/log/audit	/var/log/audit	ext3	defaults, nosuid, noexec, nodev	1	2	
LABEL=/home	/home	ext3	defaults,nosuid,nodev	1	2	
LABEL=/var	/var	ext3	defaults,nosuid	1	2	
LABEL=/boot	/boot	ext3	defaults, nosuid, noexec, nodev	1	2	
/tmp	/var/tmp	ext3	defaults, bind, nosuid, noexec, n	ode	ξV	1 2
tmpfs	/dev/shm	tmpfs	defaults	0	0	
devpts	/dev/pts	devpts	gid=5,mode=620	0	0	
sysfs	/sys	sysfs	defaults	0	0	
proc	/proc	proc	defaults	0	0	
LABEL=SWAP-sda6	swap	swap	defaults	0	0	



## Strategy

- Minimize protocols being used
- Minimize addresses being listened to
- Minimize ports being listened on

## Tools that help

- ifconfig look at device and address mappings
- netstat look at processes and their socket states
- route look at the routing table
- nmap scan the system from outside the firewall



#### IPv6

- On by default
- There are daemons that are IPv6 aware: sshd, apache, bind, xinetd, etc
- Ip6tables has to be specifically setup
- Could have service unexpectedly open to attack

#### Detection

- ifconfig | grep inet6
- inet6 addr: fe80::21d:7eff:fe00:af5d/64 Scope:Link
- inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host

### Disabling

- Create a file /etc/modprobe.d/ipv6
- Add this line inside: install ipv6 /bin/true



#### Zeroconf

- On by default
- Used by avahi for local service discovery
  - Requires a hole in firewall to allow access
  - Advertises services to others

#### Detection

- route | grep link-local
- link-local \* 255.255.0.0 U 0 0 0 eth2

### Disabling

- Edit /etc/sysconfig/network
- Add NOZEROCONF=yes
- Then remove the avahi package and its dependencies



### **Review Listening Daemons**

- Default install is tuned for general use
- Probably a few things that are unnecessary

#### Detection

netstat -tanp | grep LISTEN

### Typical output:

```
[root ~]# netstat -tanp | grep LISTEN
              0 127.0.0.1:8000
                                                     LISTEN
                                                                  2256/nasd
tcp
                                    0.0.0.0:*
              0 127.0.0.1:3306
                                    0.0.0.0:*
                                                     LISTEN
                                                                  2166/mysqld
tcp
                                    0.0.0.0:*
              0 127.0.0.1:4690
                                                     LISTEN
                                                                  2376/prelude-manage
tcp
              0 127.0.0.1:631
                                    0.0.0.0:*
                                                     LISTEN
                                                                  2057/cupsd
tcp
              0 127.0.0.1:25
                                    0.0.0.0:*
                                                     LISTEN
                                                                  2244/master
tcp
              0:::22
                                     . . . *
                                                     LISTEN
                                                                  2068/sshd
tcp
```



## Disabling Listening Daemons

- Locate the pid in the netstat command
- cat /proc/<pid>/cmdline
- If not full path, run which or locate to find utility
- rpm -qf full-path-of-daemon
- rpm -e package
- If difficult to remove due to dependencies:
  - chkconfig <service> off

### /etc/sysctl.conf settings

```
# Don't reply to broadcasts. Prevents joining a smurf attack
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1

# Enable protection for bad icmp error messages
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1

# Enable syncookies for SYN flood attack protection
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1

# Log spoofed, source routed, and redirect packets
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1
```




```
# Don't allow source routed packets
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept source route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept source route = 0
# Turn on reverse path filtering
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp filter = 1
# Don't allow outsiders to alter the routing tables
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure redirects = 0
# Don't pass traffic between networks or act as a router
net.ipv4.ip\_forward = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.send redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
```



## **Iptables**

- Default should be pretty good
- To see rules: service iptables status
- Use a GUI tool if not familiar with iptables rule syntax
- Use nmap from another machine to check effectiveness







### tcp\_wrappers

- Even if iptables is in use, configure this just in case
- Set /etc/hosts.deny to ALL: ALL
- Many daemons compiled with support
- Find by using: egrep libwrap /usr/bin/\* /usr/sbin/\* | sort
- For each program found, use its base name to set expected access rights (if there are any)
- Example: smbd: 192.168.1.



## **Unused Daemon Removal**

Remove all daemons (and packages) not being used

- This reduces attack footprint and improves performance
- Many daemons listen on the network and could be accessible

### Viewing

chkconfig –list

### Disabling

- rpm -qf /etc/rc.d/init.d/name
   rpm -e package-name
- OR chkconfig <service> off

#### Notes

- Leave cpuspeed for speedshifting cpu and irqbalance for multicore CPU
- Disable readahead, mcstransd, firstboot, (and NetworkManager for machines without wireless networking) since they are not needed.



## System Time

## Keep system time in sync

- You may need to correlate the time of disparate events across several machines to determine a chain of events
- Near impossible without common time base

## Use ntp in cron job

Create a file /etc/cron.daily/ntpdate containing the following crontab:

#!/bin/sh

/usr/sbin/ntpdate ntp-server

where ntp-server is the hostname or IP address of the site NTP server



## Configure Remaining Daemons

#### At & cron

- Only allow root and people with verified need to run cron jobs
- Setup cron.allow and cron.deny
- Setup equivalents if you have 'at' installed

#### Sshd

- Enable only ssh2 protocol (this is default in RHEL5)
- If multi-homed, consider if it needs to listen on all addresses or just one
- Do not allow root logins
- Consider adding group permission for logins, AllowGroups wheel

### MySQL

- If database is used internally to machine, make it listen on localhost
- Change passwords



## Configure Remaining Daemons

#### **Bind**

- Use chroot package
- Use ACLs
- Consider who the DNS server is used for (internal/external) and only serve DNS for those. Do not do both in one server instance.
- Do not allow zone transfers
- Do not do recursion

### Apache

- Remove all unneeded modules
- Use mod\_security to weed out injection attacks
- Set correct SE Linux Booleans to maintain functionality and protection



## Configure Remaining Daemons

### Init

- Disable interactive boot by editing /etc/sysconfig/init
- Make PROMPT=no to disable
- Also add password to single user mode. Edit /etc/inittab
- Add the following ~~:S:wait:/sbin/sulogin



## **SE Linux**

### Leave enabled and in enforcing mode

- Does not affect daemons it doesn't know about unless they are started in a confined domain, apache cgi-bin programs for example
- Provides a behavioral model that known applications should be following
- Can stop attacks before they become complete system breaches

### Use targeted policy

Strict and MLS should be used only if you need that kind of protection

#### Do boolean lockdown

- Review all booleans and set appropriately
- getsebool -a
- Generally, to secure the machine, look at things that are set to 'on' and change to 'off' if they do not apply



### SE Linux Boolean Lockdown

```
[root ~]# getsebool -a | grep ' on'
allow daemons dump core --> on
allow daemons use tty --> on
allow execmem --> on
allow execstack --> on
allow gadmin exec content --> on
allow gssd read tmp --> on
allow kerberos --> on
allow mounton anydir --> on
allow postfix local write mail spool --> on
allow staff exec content --> on
allow sysadm exec content --> on
allow unconfined exec content --> on
allow unlabeled packets --> on
allow user exec_content --> on
allow xserver execmem --> on
allow zebra write config --> on
```

browser\_confine\_xguest --> on
httpd\_builtin\_scripting --> on
httpd\_enable\_cgi --> on
httpd\_enable\_homedirs --> on
httpd\_tty\_comm --> on
httpd\_unified --> on
nfs\_export\_all\_ro --> on
nfs\_export\_all\_rw --> on
read\_default\_t --> on
samba\_run\_unconfined --> on
spamd\_enable\_home\_dirs --> on
use\_nfs\_home\_dirs --> on
user\_ping --> on

## Audit

#### Enable

- Install auditd
- chkconfig auditd on
- Audit daemon will turn on kernel auditing at boot and load rules

#### Setup correctly

- Add audit=1 to grub.conf kernel config line
- Have /var/log/audit on its own partition
- Edit /etc/audit/auditd.conf
- flush parameter should be set to sync or data
- max\_log\_file and num\_logs need to be adjusted so that you get complete use of your partition
- space\_left should be set to a number that gives the admin enough time to react to any alert message and perform some maintenance to free up disk space
- disk\_full\_action is triggered when no more room exists on the partition. All access should be terminated since no more audit capability exists.



## **Auditd**

#### Set some defaults

- Place watches on critical files
  - Edit /etc/audit/audit.rules
  - -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k shadow
- Monitor important syscalls
  - -a exit,always -S open -S openat -F exit=-EPERM
- Auditd package has CAPP, LSPP, and NISPOM rules for samples
- Syscall rules are evaluated for every syscall of every program! Use judiciously

### Review aureport output regularly

Aureport gives system security summary report



## Aureport system summary

#### **Summary Report**

Range of time in logs: 07/22/2006 08:29:01.394 - 05/07/2007 16:12:29.832 Selected time for report: 05/01/2007 00:00:01 - 05/07/2007 16:12:29.832

Number of changes in configuration: 85

Number of changes to accounts, groups, or roles: 2

Number of logins: 25

Number of failed logins: 1

Number of authentications: 29

Number of failed authentications: 1

Number of users: 2

Number of terminals: 11 Number of host names: 3 Number of executables: 59

Number of files: 3

Number of AVC denials: 46 Number of MAC events: 21 Number of failed syscalls: 16 Number of anomaly events: 33

Number of responses to anomaly events: 0

Number of crypto events: 0 Number of process IDs: 4087

Number of events: 5885



## **Access Control**

### Do not allow root logins

- This messes up the audit system since root is a shared account
- Sshd and gdm have settings to disallow root login

### pam\_tally2

 This is used to lockout an account for consecutive failed login attempts

#### pam\_access

- Used to forbid logins from certain locations, consoles, and accounts
- /etc/security/access.conf controls its config

### pam\_time

- Used to forbid logins during non-business hours
- /etc/security/time.conf controls its config



## **Access Control**

### pam\_limits

- Used to limit maximum concurrent sessions and other user restrictions
- /etc/security/limits.conf controls its config

### pam\_loginuid

- Used for all entry point daemons to set the task's loginuid and session identifier
- Loginuid and session ID are inherited by all processes at fork
- Stored inside the task struct in the kernel
- Using require-auditd module option will forbid login if auditd is not running

#### Limit access to su command

- Edit /etc/pam.d/su
- Uncomment the line saying require wheel to allow uid change
- auth required pam wheel.so use uid



## **Disable Unused Devices**

### **USB Mass Storage**

- This can be used to transfer files in and out of the system
- Best to disable when possible by editing a file /etc/modprobe.d/no-usb
- Add this line inside: install usb-storage /bin/true

#### Wireless

- Disable in BIOS
- rm -rf /lib/modules/2.6.18\*/kernel/drivers/net/wireless/\*
- Must be run after each upgrade working on something better

#### **Firewire**

- Check for /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-firewire
- If not there, disable when possible by creating a file /etc/modprobe.d/no-firewire
- Add this line inside: install firewire\_ohci /bin/true



## Secure Physical Machine

Disable boot to anything except hard drive

Do not allow booting from CD/DVD or USB devices

Disable any hardware unused

Protects against device driver flaws should any ever be found

### Lock BIOS

 After making sure to disallow USB booting, you don't want anyone to undo it

Set grub password



## **Integrity Checking**

#### **Amtu**

- Abstract Machine Test utility
- Memory, network, disk, cpu security tests
- Can be run as cron job to repeatedly assure basic security assumptions
- Results sent to audit system

#### Aide

- File Integrity testing utility
- Configured by /etc/aide.conf
- --init snapshots the disksystem to /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz
- Copy snapshot to immutable or safe location
- Rename snapshot to /var/lib/aide/aide.db.gz before doing comparison
- --check will compare current with snapshot for differences
- Summary sent to audit system



## New Security Features since RHEL5 GA

#### **NULL Pointer Dereference Protection**

- MAP\_FIXED flag to mmap syscall can be used to map page 0.
- vm.mmap min addr sysctl defaults to 64k
- SE Linux policy arbitrates access and CAP\_SYS\_RAWIO for DAC

#### SHA256 Password hashes

- Previously only md5 and des, now sha256 and sha512 have been added
- authconfig --passalgo=sha256 --update

#### Rsyslog

- Regex file splitting
- Execute commands
- TCP connection
- Database backend

#### TCG/TPM

Tech preview in 5.2, supported in 5.3



## Questions?

NSA guidance: http://www.nsa.gov/notices/notic00004.cfm? Address=/snac/os/redhat/rhel5-guide-i731.pdf

Email: sgrubb @redhat.com

